| Abstract [eng] |
“Man infinitely surpasses man”—wrote Pascal. “But if he surpasses himself too much, he does not surpass himself at all”—adds Jean Luc-Nancy. How human reason relates to itself despite its constant transformations? How it determines and recognizes itself in medias res? In this dissertation, the transition made by the post-Kantian idealists from mere epistemological inquiry to the investigation into the very activity of reason that alone justifies and limits it forms the general horizon. It is attempted to justify the idea that the Schelling-Hegel tandem, taken as a paradigmatic figure of German idealism, redefines the performativity of reason by revealing its afformative, eventual, and liminal character. In contrast to the still prevailing idealistic narratives, which take the subject to be encapsulated within itself, of ontology as reducible to epistemology, and of the tension/opposition/denial of the world and of experience, the idealist performative introduced in this thesis addresses reason in its dynamic modality, as the taking place of reason. |
