| Abstract [eng] |
Membership in a collective defence organization exposes its smaller members to a security dilemma, providing conflicting incentives to ensure adequate contribution vs. pursue a free riding strategy. The aim of this dissertation is to identify the main characteristics of small states’ burden sharing behaviour within NATO, as well as the factors determining its variation. The research is based on the economic theory of alliances, which explores the relationship between the characteristics of security provided by the Alliance and internal burden sharing dynamics within the organization. Quantitative contribution indices, as well as qualitative assessment of defence policy are used to examine burden sharing behaviour of four NATO small states (Denmark, Greece, Latvia, and Czech Republic) between 2007 and 2012. The dissertation claims that security, ensured by the contemporary NATO, can be considered as an excludable and rival “club” good. Thus, countries, willing to take advantage of NATO security guarantees, have an incentive to ensure proper “membership fee”. Research revealed that small states were balancing between two conflicting incentives: not only have they significantly contributed to the key areas of Alliance activities, but also decreased their compliance with the main membership requirements. Assumed burden was substantially different among the small states, varying between passive participation and proactive membership. These differences can be explained by two key factors: (a) NATO’s importance in country’s defence system and (b) compatibility of priorities between national and NATO agendas. The research has led to four theoretical models of small states’ burden sharing behavior, which conceptualize the variation within the group, thus expanding the scope and applicability of the economic theory of alliances. . |
