| Abstract [eng] |
Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran’s asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran’s claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents’ perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence. |
