| Abstract [eng] |
The paper focuses on the moral philosophy of I. Kant. More specifically, on the question of how normativity arising in the relationship between two or more subjects should be understood. The paper offers a conception of social normativity, to which morality and politics are subordinated. Alongside finding a way to articulate the relationship between morality and politics, the paper also offers a way to understand them as rooted in the acting subject rather than dependent on the recognition of at least a single other subject. The paper's thesis statement is: in Kant's philosophy, the very act of self-reflection is a sufficient condition for claiming that the concept of subjectivity contains a moral and political normativity that becomes the rule against which the subject's actions in relation to other subjects are judged. With this in mind, the paper examines the structures of cognition and self-consciousness, attributable to the acting subject, found in Kant's philosophy. On the basis of these contents, a way to understand the origin of social normativity as rooted precisely in them is sought, which makes it possible to reinterpret both the moral and the political within the framework of theoretical, rather than solely practical, philosophy. |
