| Abstract [eng] |
The development of artificial intelligence technologies is changing our daily lives. Solutions based on the operation of natural intelligence are being replaced by the functions performed by artificial intelligence algorithms. This results not only in the distribution of the workload, but also in faster achievement of results. Criminal procedure is based on the protection of the public interest; thus, the application of artificial intelligence is associated with the implementation of a utopian idea to many. It is this radical perception of the perspective of applying artificial intelligence which is fuelling public distrust in the operation of such technology. The goals of criminal procedure are focused on the prompt and high-quality detection of a criminal offense. However, the achievement of such results is often hampered by the excessive length of the pre-trial investigation and the heavy workload of the court system. Therefore, in order to minimize the workload and facilitate the work not only of judges, but also of pre-trial institutions, algorithmizing the public sector is encouraged, ensuring the idea of implementing an auxiliary function. The implementation of a support function is related not only to the reduction of the workload, optimisation of criminal procedure, but also to the protection of human rights from possible violations caused by artificial intelligence. By ensuring such protection, it is the duty of the judge to act within the limits of discretion defined by law and to review the proposals generated by artificial intelligence systems. The operation of supranational law is aimed at anticipating the negative risks posed by an artificial system and, thus, ensuring the prevention of harm. Achieving this goal requires legal regulations which define the limits of the operation of artificial intelligence and guarantees the effective implementation of the auxiliary function. |
