| Abstract [eng] |
In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of „One freedom“ and the proponents of „late Republicanism“. I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce „the third way“, whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of „One freedom“ isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy. |
