Abstract [eng] |
The Master's thesis analyses the problem of the interpretation of law and the limits of the creation of law, examining both the relevant interpretations given in the case law and the conclusions reached by scholars in the doctrine. The thesis analyses the activity of legal interpretation, its relationship with legal reasoning and the importance of the latter in the work of the court. Rational legal reasoning helps to achieve the goal of convincing consumers that the judicial system is working efficiently, but it also encourages the courts to make more active use of their discretionary powers and to use substantive interpretation. Through substantive interpretation, the law is developed. The development of the law is a continuation of the legislative process and therefore also qualifies as legislation. Consequently, the courts have the discretion to create law by developing it, but they can only do so within the limits of their discretion. Judicial activism is a concept that describes the role of a court exercising discretion (a court that interprets the law in a meaningful way, a court that develops the law), and it is therefore not correct to use it in a negative context. An activist court may deviate from the text of the law, but not from the political will of the legislator. Deviating from the political will of the legislator is an abuse of the court's interpretation of the law and is described in terms of juristocracy, the juridification of politics. Despite the political will of the legislator, the court is does not interpretate and develope the law, i.e. it does not continue the legislative process, it de facto creates a new legal rule. An analysis of the case law of the Lithuanian courts of general competence reveals that a court decision contra legem is regarded as negating the will of the legislator and is therefore not applicable. For this reason when referring judicial activism to the concept of contra legem, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the two possible meanings of this concept, i.e. a judgment contra legem (as deviating from the text of the law) and a judgment contra legem (as overturning the will of the legislature). |