| Abstract [eng] |
This master thesis – Decision‐making in the European Union: the case of EU Mobility package – analyses how the EU decision-making process takes place when different EU actors (Member states and EU institutions) have different preferences. The aim of this paper is to study the adoption of the EU Mobilty package and to determine which actors had the most influence on its decision-making process, and how this influence was used. In the first section, the theoretic background is discussed. First, a theoretic model is constructed using Héritier`s “first mover” strategy with Scharpf`s rational choice institutionalism framework. According to Héritier, the EU Member states offers the Commission their regulatory proposals. Commission views highly regulated Member states as regulatory innovators. Thus, if the state`s proposal is in line with the general goal of Commission, it may consider it. Whereas Scharpf`s framework offers to analyze how EU actors interact, form coalitions and use the formal and informal decision-making processes to achieve their preferred goals. In the empirical analysis section, the adoption of the EU Mobility package is analysed against the Héritier-Scharpf decision-making framework using the process-tracing method. Firstly, the actors’ (EU Member states, institutions, interest groups) positions and their coalitions according to the positions were analysed. Secondly, the contents of the Mobility package were compared to the actors’ coalitions’ positions. To check whether and which coalition influenced the final content of the package, the interviews were conducted with Lithuanian government, Commission DG MOVE, European Parliament and Lithuanian transport sector representatives. Their accounts were also compared to the other gathered empirical data. The main findings of the analysis suggest that national interest groups contributed to the formation of Western EU Member states national positions. The unilateral actions in the transport sector by the Member states forced the Commission to consider their positions while forming the Mobility package, which introduced new regulations for the transport sector. However, the Western Member states during the debates in the Council managed to transform the package and to include more regulation, in opposition to the Eastern Member states. The Western states` position was also shared by the Parliament, The adopted Mobility package introduced new regulations that, according to the Eastern states, is impeding competition and is against the rules of the EU single market. The empirical analysis carried out in this Master's thesis both confirms and refutes the hypotheses raised in the literature on EU regulatory and transport policy. Academic literature suggests that the Commission's interest lies in establishing a level playing field in the single market and liberalising transport services. However, in the case of the Mobility package Commission used the Member states regulatory proposals under considerable political pressure. The study also showed that MEPs may be voting according to national preferences, i.e., contrary to the prevailing position in academic literature. It also confirmed the hypotheses of the academic literature concerning the greater influence of the Parliament and the Council in the trilogues, and that the Commission takes on the role of a negotiator, as it has a greater interest in reaching an agreement. The ideas of the multi-level governance theory on the importance of the participation of interest groups in political life was also confirmed. Finally, the conclusions of the analysis of the EU Mobility Package support the claims that, following the EU's eastward enlargement in 2004, the Western EU Member States are using the social dimension in the regulatory framework to protect their markets from competition from companies in the Eastern Member States. |
