| Abstract [eng] |
The 2015 migration crisis showed that European countries are divided, and the European Union - slow to act regarding migration policy. With the EU facing multiple challenges and dilemmas in the field of migration, which are foreseen to become only worse in the future, it is necessary to understand the preferences and strategies used by different EU member states in this field, including Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. It has been argued that Southern and CEE countries, including Lithuania, have traditionally adopted a passive role in the EU’s asylum policies. However, when in 2021 Lithuania faced an influx of migrants from Belarus, the country reacted rather actively and appealed to the EU for solidarity. Nevertheless, unlike Southern countries during the 2015 migration crisis, even when facing a record-high number of refugees next to its border, Lithuania did not push for migrant quotas at the EU level. Therefore, it is interesting to find out: 1) whether Lithuania actually deviated from the traditionally passive behavior of CEE countries in the EU’s migration policies during the 2021 migration crisis; 2) why Lithuania in 2021 continued to avoid supporting the adoption of European reforms related to mandatory migration quotas. The study's main purpose is to find out if and why the changed nature of the migration crisis vis-à-vis Lithuania changed its national preferences and strategies regarding the EU’s migration policies. In order to do so, qualitative comparative analysis and case study methods with semi-structured interviews are employed. In conclusion, the findings of the study confirm that the changed nature of the migration crisis vis-à-vis Lithuania changed its national preferences regarding the EU’s migration policies, but only partially. As predicted by liberal intergovernmentalism, after facing record-breaking migration flows, Lithuania’s preferences changed from the desire to maintain the status quo to the desire to reform the EU’s migration policy. However, contrary to what the theory had foreseen, Lithuania, as in 2015, continued to resist mandatory migration quotas. This was due to politicization. The politicization of the 2021 migration crisis in Lithuania, in contrast to Southern European countries, was focused on efforts to prevent illegal migrants from entering the country and the EU. Interestingly, contrary to what postfunctionalism anticipated, the crisis was politicized not only by populist or non-governmental but also by the ruling parties. The crisis was also politicized based not only on cultural dimensions, but also on national security arguments. However, in the case of Lithuania, politicization did not mean polarization, as there was a consensus between the main political parties that the migration crisis is a hybrid attack against Lithuania. Thus, politicization without polarization meant that the 2021 migration crisis in Lithuania was securitized. Lastly, the changed nature of the migration crisis and the partly changed national preferences led to also a partly changed strategy used by Lithuania in the EU’s migration policy. Lithuania’s case is unique, because it used two different strategies in the same policy field, during the same crisis. In relation to mandatory migration quotas, Lithuania adopted the fence-sitting strategy, while on the issue related to protecting external EU borders (which was Lithuania’s priority), Lithuania employed the pace-setting strategy. Future research could seek to explore deeper the relationship between politicization and securitization, as well as how much Lithuania’s proposals in EU‘s migration policy were credible. One could also seek to analyze to what extent Lithuania managed to initiate changes at the European Union in the field of migration policy. Lastly, this study can be a suitable additional source for those seeking to examine what strategies Lithuania tends to use the most often in the EU to implement their preferences. |
