| Abstract [eng] |
The master thesis “Securitization of cyberspace in Lithuania 2018 – 2023“ aims to study how well the institutions, responsible for shaping and implementing national security strategies, align their public cyber security discourse with what is already embedded in strategic documents. From the perspective of the theory of securitization, this aspect plays a major role in further securitization, since incoherent use of discourse can tamper the whole process. Due to evolving threats and everchanging geopolitical position, resulting in significant threats from Russia, China and other international actors, it is held that the process of cyberspace securitization in Lithuania is continuous rather than already finished. This claim was also proven during the analysis part of the document. The paper first analyses the theoretical background on securitization, starting with its beginnings in the Copenhagen school, criticism of the theory, and the adaptations of it in the field in cybersecurity. This has also allowed for creation of criteria, which was used to identify referential objects, existential threats and extraordinary measures, which were later used for studying documents and institutional discourse. The paper then analyzes how cyberspace was securitized in strategic documents and laws in Lithuania in 2015, with the passing of the National law on cybersecurity, as well as prior unsuccessful attempts, starting with 1996, to have a full understanding of the process in the country. The analysis part concludes with an analysis of strategic documents and laws passed between 2018 and 2023. They were later compared to the public institutional discourse of the same period – 49 public statements from institutions and 10 from cybersecurity experts were analyzed. The findings of the analysis are as follows: • Despite the successful securitization back in 2015, Lithuanian cyberspace is being continuously securitized, as it appears as an important aspect of national security in all major documents that determine Lithuanian national security. • Various institutions that shape and implement Lithuanian national security politics also participate in the process, however, rather vaguely. Only three out of seven that were studied did it more actively. This includes the President (during D. Grybauskaitė‘s presidency), the Committee for National Security and Defense, and the Ministry of Defense. The rest were rather idle or did not see cybersecurity as a matter of priority. This partially confirms the hypothesis that said institutions are an important factor in securitizing cyberspace. • The discourse of these institutions also partially matches to what is laid out in strategic documents. The threat of China, Russia and hacker groups appears both in the documents and discourse of representatives of institutions. The same can be said about suggest measures (suggested increase of funding, defensive capabilities, stricter judicial regulations). However, there are some discrepancies on referential objects: strategic documents tend to emphasize critical infrastructure more often, while the institutional discourse was broader, except for D. Grybauskatė, the Committee for National Security and Defense, and the Ministry of Defense, which mostly emphasized the same referential object. The findings allowed for recommendations to be made, which include more frequent communication and securitizing of cyberspace from all analyzed institutions, as well as more coherent and accurate discourse on referential objects. |
