| Abstract [eng] |
Germany‘s epochal foreign policy turn – Zeitenwende – has indeed been one of the greatest geopolitical aftershocks that followed Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. It is ambitious as much as it was radical and unexpected. Therefore, it’s not surprising it causes anxiety as government tries to avoid a crash or a prospect of one. This case study is based on theoretical considerations over what forces drive and stabilize foreign policy change. To achieve this, a research model is constructed by combining the framework foreign policy change, developed by Jakob Gustavsson (1999), with the concept of ‘stabilizers’, developed by Kjell Goldmann (1982). With economic interdependence and public opinion operating as external and internal stabilizers, as well as decisionmaker’s personality traits and bureaucratic-organizational barriers being treated as elements of change process, the combined model seeks to explain the effect of these variables on foreign policy change. The latter consists of three – geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic – policy dimensions. Official government statements, media articles and opinion polls ranging from 2022 to 2023 are thus analyzed using quantitative content analysis to explain the link between the dependent and independent variables. The research shows that in over a year most progress has been achieved in geoeconomic dimension with German government having taken both short-term and structural steps to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuel imports. While progress has also been made other two fields, namely by supplying weapons to Ukraine and willing to act against Russia, it has been more limited to short term measures. Suggestions that trade could still be resumed once Russia stops its invasion suggest a significant part of political elites does not consider Russia a threat to Germany’s vital interests, while almost zero progress in using the special €100 bln Bundeswehr modernization fund threatens to not only to undermine its own security and contribution to NATO collective defense but also threaten its ability to assist Ukraine in the future. The research found that the four variables – interdependence, public mood, Olaf Scholz’s personality traits and bureaucratic inertia – have all either slowed down or suppressed the impulse of foreign policy change. Germany’s dependence on Russian natural gas has limited and delayed its effort to act against the regime however, significantly less than many expected mainly due to successful combination of measures taken to diversify energy imports and mild climate. However, economic risks do remain an important risk factor for Germany and might complicate its foreign policy-related efforts in the future. Public opinion as a domestic stabilizer remained reasonably favorable for EU-led effort to increase economic pressure, despite it being sensitive to external economic pressure. However, throughout the public was arguably more cautious on weapon deliveries and favorable to finding diplomatic solutions to the conflict. Olaf Scholz’s political background and some of the publicly observable traits suggest he and prefers to hold a tight grip on decision-making process and doesn’t want to be seen as someone who can be easily ‘pushed’ by outside forces to make critical decisions. Combined with his party’s historical sensitivity to Russia, these traits make him more likely to delay or reduce the scope of the change. Finally, efforts to renew foreign policy are further delayed at the bureaucratic-organizational stage. These brakes only apply to geostrategic dimension as procurement of essential military equipment lag due to bureaucratic inertia and national security strategy has not yet been published as a result of tensions between Federal Chancellery and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. |
