| Abstract [eng] |
Master’s thesis “Why Lithuania sets the pace on China while other Baltic states sit on the fence: it’s not about China” analyses the variables that determined different policy strategies on the issue of China pursued by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia vis-à-vis the US and the EU in 2019–2022. On the basis of liberal theory of state preferences and literature on small state studies, an analytical research tool to study variables determining small state strategies vis-à-vis a hegemon is developed, and a qualitative empirical research is carried out on the basis of primary and secondary qualitative and quantitative data sources, while employing a process-tracing method enabling to form and test hypotheses. The research finds that the Baltic states pursue their China strategies not in relation to China, but vis-à-vis the US and the EU. The policy strategy on the issue of China in relation to the US is driven by state preferences in the context of the perception of security interests, while the negotiation strategy pursued at the EU level depends on the security policy strategy pursued vis-à-vis the US as well as the economic interests towards the EU. In addition, the negotiation strategy at the EU level is often impacted by domestic policy variables, such as centrality and heterogeneity, as well as the economic and institutional relations with the EU. The research concludes that Lithuania prioritises security interests and hence pursues a pace-setting policy strategy on the issue of China in line with the US top priority (strategic competition with China), thus gaining a super-ally status aiming to secure the US protection against Russia. Lithuania sets the pace on China at the EU level as well, seeking to upload its preferences onto the EU level aiming to gain EU’s economic and institutional support. Since Lithuania’s pace-setting strategy seeks to secure its top priority (security), domestic policy variables do not have any impact on it. The research finds that Latvia prioritises economic interests and hence remains passive on China, as its preferences diverge from those of the US (strategic competition with China). Nevertheless, hoping to secure the US protection against Russia, it cooperates with the US in other areas, retaining an ally status. Still, domestic policy variables, such as high heterogeneity in the ruling coalition and low institutional capacity prevent Latvia from uploading its preferences onto the EU level. As a result, Latvia is hiding while expecting physical protection from the US, economic benefits from the EU, and economic advantages from cooperation with China, and joins coalitions while using foot-dragging strategy. The research establishes that Estonia prioritises security interests and hence sets the pace in an area important to the US (cyber security), thus gaining a super-ally status to secure US protection against Russia and affording to remain passive on China. On the EU level, Estonia seeks maximum physical and economic security trying to reconcile the US and EU interests, thus hedging and forming coalitions while employing fence-sitting strategy, also partly due to domestic variables such as heterogeneity of the ruling coalition. Thus, the thesis provides an answer as to why the policy strategy on the issue of China pursued by Lithuania has diverged from those of the other two Baltic states and, in addition, establishes differences between the types of strategies employed by Latvia and Estonia. |
