| Abstract [eng] |
The COVID-19 pandemic, despite being a health crisis, undoubtedly has affected many other areas and almost all countries globally. According to the latest academic research, observable consequences could be only the tip of the iceberg. Latest data show that the force majeure crisis has contributed to the accumulation of power in non-democratic countries as well as paved the way for authoritarian regimes to expand their interests and influence both nationally and globally. However, theorists argue that power mobilisation depends on a broader context in each country. This led the author to systemize existing literature into her theoretical model which shows consequences to various political processes during force majeure crisis. It consists of four main pillars: history, political culture, public administration, and the role in the international arena. This model could be generalizable when it comes to dealing with a state of shock in different political contexts, only the content of these pillars might vary in each country. Aim of the Thesis: to examine the impact that COVID-19 pandemic crisis has had on transitional justice mechanisms and Rwanda’s reconciliation policy (its objectives, instruments and results). Qualitative research was conducted and the method of triangulation was used to collect information: 1) early pilot interviews, and participant observation conducted at a distance; 2) semi-structured expert interviews; 3) media content and document analysis. The theoretical model helped examine how Rwanda’s regime politics, which is based on four main pillars that gained contextual values, was retransmitted in the context of reconciliation policy, when country was faced with a force majeure threat. Firstly, the narrative of the country’s history and grief has been reborn and has been exploited to justify harsh and sometimes overly aggressive measures by the authorities. Secondly, submissive Rwandan society has been exploited as a basis for the expansion of the government’s power, restrictions. The prevailing humble attitude and trust in the regime’s decisions has strengthened government control over reconciliation policy. Thirdly, the public administration system and highly centralized control of the government, in the face of the crisis, allowed to expand and enhance monitoring network of subordinate actors. Strengthened control of radio and television content have significantly contributed to people’s support of the centralized reconciliation policy narratives. Lastly, Rwanda’s ambition to consolidate international leadership has not been abandoned. However, the priority of reconciliation and unity was replaced by successful crisis management narrative and measures, such as new investments, rapid modernisation of the health sector, vaccine diplomacy, while leaving aside a biggest part of post-conflict society unprotected. Thus, it deepened the gap between the two (un)reconciled realities of Rwanda. After all, it is reasonable to presume that reconciliation itself was deteriorating as it lost the continuity, bottom-up initiatives and routine practices as well as community level interactions based on intergroup trust and recognition, which are key elements in achieving a thick reconciliation. Thus, the reconciliation process has become less comprehensive and inclusive, more centralised and top-down, implemented with little involvement of the most vulnerable groups in society. In conclusion, it is important to stress that more participant observations and continuous studies are needed as soon as the epidemiological situation is suitable for fieldwork to be conducted, to see what impact pandemic had on transitional justice mechanisms. Furthermore, such Western-centric analysis of managing the COVID-19 pandemic crisis and evaluation of the impact on reconciliation could be overhasty and based on false premises that researcher had due to her foreigner status. |
