| Abstract [eng] |
The paper contains analysis of the French president Emmanuel Macron’s foreign policy in Lebanon during his first term in the office. The political and economic crisis in Lebanon started in 2019 and was further escalated by explosion in Beirut on 4th of August 2020. Despite France’s efforts to deescalate it, the situation did not stabilize. Using theory of neoclassical realism and process tracing method this analysis aims to reveal the reasons of the French foreign policy failure. Theory of neoclassical realism, while maintaining international system as the main independent variable, includes intervening variables, which directly influence foreign policy decisions – leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions. Due to the time frame of this particular case, the first two are selected for analysis. Additional context is provided to create a deeper understanding of the situation and to determine whether raised hypotheses are correct. The main hypothesis of this paper states that the French foreign policy failed because E. Macron overestimated France’s influence in Lebanon and raised overly ambitious goals for Lebanon to achieve, which were not supported with accurate means. The main objectives that E. Macron presented to the Lebanese governing institutions after the Beirut explosion were formation of legitimate and trustworthy government, capable of implementing additional reforms of financial and energy sectors, and fight with corruption. These requirements were backed by ultimatums for international humanitarian aid, raised three times since the explosion together with the United Nations the World Bank and other countries. However, despite the relatively strict measures from the French government, Lebanon was not able to reach these goals. The analysis revealed that the international system of that period was uncertain due to shifts of major Western powers (the US and the UK), the US withdrawal from JCPOA agreement and rising risk of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and growing terrorism threat due to unstable situation in the whole Middle East region. Although E. Macron, being ambitious and determined leader, acted accordingly to his personal values of progress, democratization and human rights, strategic culture played a more important role in the process. France maintains an image of an influential and authoritative country, acting as an example for other nations and bearing responsibility for former colonies, therefore E. Macron was expected to act as a decisive leader. However, it is possible that proposed financial and humanitarian aid was not enough for Lebanon to achieve reforms, and more thorough involvement in the national politics of the country acting as a mediator between separate coalitions would have provided better results. Two other hypotheses were presented as well. The first stipulated about France’s resources being directed towards other parts of the Middle East and Sahel despite E. Macron’s rhetoric on Lebanon. The second stated that Lebanon was not able to implement the reforms due to flaws of its’ national politics – divide between political parties, corruption, nepotism, and influence from outside powers. According to gathered data, the third hypothesis is likely to be the main reason of the French policy failure, therefore it could serve as a basis for future research. |
