| Abstract [eng] |
This master thesis analyzes the unrepresentable Auschwitz problem. In this work, the problem of Jewish extermination is suggested not to be called the Holocaust, but Shoah instead, according to the arguments raised by Agamben. The Shoah problem is embedded in philosophical considerations about evil, human being or politics that need to be rethought to prevent the recurrence of similar atrocities. The question is how to speak properly about Shoah and Auschwitz itself as the place of the most radical evil. Lyotard creates the position that Auschwitz is not representable, the only exception might be Lanzmann's film Shoah. Agamben and Didi-Huberman contradicted this idea. The latter states that, in order to know, we have to imagine. Didi-Huberman offers a dynamic phenomenological interpretation of 4 photos of Auschwitz taken by prisoners from Sonderkommando. The author argues that we have to rely on images in spite of all, i. e. we can not discard the fragment even though it does not contain the whole. The case of Son of Saul once again revives the debate by reconsidering the relationship between representation and imagination. The cinematic imagination, which operates in an ethical mode, constantly assembles internal images. It can be argued that the tensions arising from various inconsistencies (montage, script, image and speech, focus, laughter and tragedy) activate the imagination and stimulate cognition. The analysis of the films Shoah, Son of Saul, Schindler's List, Life is Beautiful and the theatrical productions The Filler and Austerlitz suggests that a work of art, which does not duplicate the flux of consciousness, enables the spectator's philosophical thinking. Due to the uniqueness of the event, every representation of Auschwitz must maintain high ethical standards. |
