| Abstract [eng] |
The classical view of split-brain cases asserts that these individuals do not possess unity of consciousness. Since a surgical severing of corpus callosum supposes a possibility for divided streams of consciousness, questions for the possibility to maintaining unified consciousness, arise. The Unity Thesis formulated by Bayne and Chalmers (2003) cannot sustain unity of consciousness, a more subtle evaluation of empirical findings is required. This paper analyses different types of conscious unity and addresses conflicting models – the switch model (Bayne, 2010) and two streams model (Schechter, 2018). According to the first one in split-brain cases there remains a single stream of consciousness which switches between hemispheres with the help of attentional processes. The second model asserts that agential consciousness remains unified, but phenomenological unity is divided into two streams. This discussion is supplemented by empirical findings from Pinto et al. (2017) who found only weak support from empirical findings, on which the classical understanding of disunified consciousness in split-brain cases is founded. This paper claims that split-brain cases can bring valuable insights into the discussion of unity of consciousness, and empirical findings show that a strong unity thesis is unfounded, because while agential consciousness seems to exhibit unity, the case for phenomenal unity is more complicated. |
