| Abstract [eng] |
Approaches to Theories of Perception in the Externalism about the Mind The purpose of this thesis is to review the philosophy of externalism about the mind from the perspective of philosophy of perception. The thesis is based on the assumption that externalism about the mind contrasts with the representational theory of consciousness. Content externalism is defined through two main types: the metaphysical content externalism, associated with H. Putnam‘s philosophy and T. Burge‘s ecological content theory. This is based on the way these theories define criterias for meaning individuation. Meanwhile, vehicle externalism is divided into the original A.Clark‘s and D. Chalmer‘s theory of the extended mind, and S. Gallagher‘s theory of socially extended mind. The position advocated here is that metaphysical content externalism cannot substantiate the assumptions of externalism about the mind, since meaning is independent from the psychological state of the individual. This creates a certain disjunction of consciousness and the world, and it also implicitly pressuposes the representative nature of consiousness. H. Putnam‘s philosophy of perception cannot justify antirepresentational attitudes and inevitably creates contradictory statements. It is argued that the most consistent link between externalism about the mind and the philosophy of perception is the concept of objective representation. It maintains a representational model of perception that avoids the problems of identity and omniscence, and is compatible with contemporary cognitive sciences. Perception based on probability, as expressed in the predictive coding theory, allows the possibility of intermediate and only partially veridical representations. It allows to define the perception as constantly „objectifying“ but never fully objective. Vehicle externalism is related to the concept of extended perception. A strategy to deny the extended perception was chosen through the denial of the extended cognition itself, as it is the only theoretical prospect where perceptions could be extended at the expense of other vehicles. The criticism of the theory revolves around the problems of system‘s intentionality and endless reduction, which is solved by means of additional criteria of conceptual integration and coupling of cognitive ownership. It is argued that conceptual integration denies the principles of the extended mind, thus, justifying the vehicle internalism, which is reducible to ecological content externalism. |
