| Abstract [eng] |
The paper examines arguments for naturalism and for theism as alternative metaphysical stances in regard to their reconciliation with practice and methods of natural science. Particularly, the question of interrelation between methodological and ontological naturalism is being considered along with the question of reliability of one’s cognitive faculties compared in either theistic or naturalistic ontology. The relevance of both issues emerges from currently ongoing polemic on these topics. While employing the arguments used by critics of both positions, their ontological stances are not being adopted in this paper; following these arguments and adding one’s own, the paper seeks to provide reasoning that neither arguments for naturalism based on natural science nor evolution-based arguments for theism are sufficient for justifying respective stance. The main thesis of this paper claims that the controversy between evolutionary naturalism and theism have failed, because naturalism as a metaphysical stance is not entailed by methodological naturalism and therefore is not epistemically sound on the basis of natural science, whereas theism does not warrant reliability of cognitive faculties and therefore does not constitute an alternative for naturalism with regard to this reliability. The paper demonstrates that evolutionary argument against naturalism can lead towards skepticism about reliability of cognitive faculties as much as naturalism is claimed to lead by the very argument. The arguments provided in this paper are attended by the attitude that one’s choice of metaphysical stance between naturalism and theism is irrelevant in regard to natural science, and therefore neither can be justified by it nor is capable of enriching or enhancing that science. It’s also the main conclusion consisting with acknowledgment that controversy between analyzed stances is not successful, for it rests unduly on practical reasoning by which the richness of discussion about theoretical stances is being robbed off. |
