| Abstract [eng] |
The European Union is an exceptional organization that promotes close cooperation between European countries with similar values. By being part of such a union, the Member States, which have given some of their economic, social and financial decision-making prerogatives to the EU's common decision-making bodies, have the opportunity to achieve common results more quickly and effectively together. By setting consensus-based common development guidelines, the EU is successfully integrating in the areas of economy, climate change, transport and many more. The exception to this is certainly the sphere of defense. National security and related issues are primarily a matter for the states, which are of paramount importance to each state and do not require compromises with other states in the Union. Naturally, it would be difficult for states to find common and, importantly, effective solutions in the field of defense: Member States' strategic cultures differ: both in terms of perceptions of ‘enemies' outside the Union and in terms of security preferences, also in the level of initiative in security and defense area. However, EU-wide cooperation in certain areas of defense seems possible and necessary. After the 2014 events in Ukraine, the harsh rhetoric of former US President Donald Trump towards NATO, the UK's decision to withdraw from the EU, the migration crisis and the terrorist attacks made the EU re-evaluate the changed security situation, calling for a new approach to the EU security and defense policy. Over the last few years, since 2016, programs and initiatives such as the European Defence Fund, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the Permanent Structured Cooperation point to the Union's ambition to pool Member States' capabilities and objectives through the European Defence Agency and its centralized defense capability analyses. However, although the initiatives focus on greater interoperability of capabilities and cross-border cooperation, the work aims to examine whether EU defense integration is taking place and what elements are necessary for this integration. In view of the different levels of strategic autonomy to be achieved at EU level, mentioned in the EU Global Strategy, this work focuses on the EU's internal regulations, principles and policies to find ways to bring together the different interests and practices of Member States, including countries with small or no defense industries. The study seeks to identify the principles of EU defence policy and defence industry policy, to explain the latest principles of the latest Common Security and Defence Policy instruments (PESCO, CDP, EDIDP and CARD) and the factors promoting protectionist or competitive activity in their context as examples of countries with different industries. 6 countries are chosen for analysis: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Sweden and Lithuania. The analysis includes identifying the current compatibility / incompatibility between EU defence policy principles and EU CSDP instruments enabling protectionist or competitive activities in the context of the defence industry. Finally, recommendations are provided for Lithuanian defence industry development in the EU in the light of implementation of CSDP tools and initiatives and the current situation of the defence industry in Lithuania. The rational choice institutionalism theory was chosen in order to combine the impact of both systemic and national factors on the protectionism of the states’ defence industries. For this study, four factors were chosen: the institutional framework, the official and unofficial rules of the game, the difference in size of the defence industries among countries and the links between the government and the defence companies in a country. |
