| Abstract [eng] |
This study attempts to analyze the difference in logic of nuclear deterrence in the India-Pakistan dyad as compared to NATO–USSR nuclear relations in Cold War Western Europe through the case study of the Kargil War of 1999. The object of this study is behavior, moves and public speeches of various high-ranking Indian and Pakistani officers during the Kargil War period. The main aim of the work is to, through the case study of Kargil War using the model provided by game theory, conclude whether Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations are driven by the classical type stability/instability paradox or not. In case the conclusion is that a classical type of stability/instability paradox does not drive it, attempt to describe the reasons of these deviations from standard logic of paradox. To achieve the aim, the following tasks were set: to describe the theory of nuclear deterrence, its presumptions and history, to study the main tendencies of modern Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations using the case study of Kargil War through the two-stage deterrence and escalation game model lenses, to point out and describe possible reasons of deviations from the classical stability/instability paradox effect logic in India-Pakistani dyad. The problem of the work comes from differences in nuclear deterrence logic perceived by the academic researchers of the South Asia region. Even though the strategic stability provided by nuclear deterrence lowered the effectiveness of it in lower levels of conflict in Cold War Western Europe, in the Indo-Pakistani dyad it is specifically the strategic instability that is a driving force of instability in lower levels of conflict. It follows that nuclear bombs in Indo-Pakistani relations work not as a deterrent but rather a weapon that provides opportunities to engage in conflict for both countries through a belief that other side will refrain from retaliation in fear of a nuclear exchange. The research has shown that during the Kargil War, neither India nor Pakistan had a credible nuclear threat in any of the conflict levels and none of the combatants believed that other side could realistically use their nuclear arsenal at any stage of the war. Pakistan was only planning to use their nuclear capabilities for a form of nuclear blackmail to attract the attention of international community. All in all, it was concluded that the Kargil War situation represented a “double chicken” type situation in which the instability in the strategic level drove the instability in lower levels of conflict. In this, the theses of Southern Asia region researchers that the logic of nuclear deterrence is working based on a different logic than it was in Cold War Western Europe were confirmed. This may be happening for many reasons, some of which are the nationalistic nature of Indo–Pakistani conflict, the stakes being lower in case of nuclear exchange than it was during Cold War because both sides are in a possession of much less nuclear weapons than the NATO or USSR and also there may be some problems in the definition of classical stability/instability paradox that need to be revised in academic field in the future. Going forward, it is recommended to analyze nuclear dyads by taking into account their nature, e.g. nationalistic (Indo-Pakistani) or ideological (USSR-NATO) dyads, which may help to more accurately predict relations between two nuclear countries by taking into account the historical environment of their relations. Two-stage nuclear deterrence game was not previously used by researchers to study the dynamics of Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations especially in comparison with situation in Western Europe Cold War. In addition, this model was not used to study Kargil War either. There is a lack of research of Indo-Pakistani relations in the Lithuanian academic field, especially through the lenses of rational choice theory. This works aims to fill in this shortage in the discipline of international relations field. |
