| Abstract [eng] |
The paper examines the concept of Gestell found in Heidegger 's philosophy, which refers to a specific relationship with the world inherent in the modern technoscientific worldview, the main features of which are the instrumentalisation of beings and their transformation into resources in constant readiness (Bestand). The main focus in on the critique of Heidegger’s position on technology in current philosophical debate: first, there is the contradiction of the very concept of Gestell, where its total and universal nature should make it impossible to detect and distinguish; second, the essentialist nature of this concept ignores the social, historical context and the empirical aspect, and third, the development of technology itself and its relationship with man is considered to be of deterministic, autonomous and negative nature. The paper argues that such assessments stem from an unreasonable demand for an alternative post-technical ontology, from the fact that Heidegger's philosophy cannot be called a closed, complete and intrinsically coherent system, and from the misinterpretation of Heidegger's own position. The paper claims that Heidegger’s position is not disqualified by its aporetic nature and is not unproductive for further research. |
