Abstract [eng] |
The Problem of Metaphysics of Time in the Interpretations of McTaggart's Paradox J. M. E. McTaggart‘s argument (paradox) for the unreality of time has become central to the analytic philosophy of time. Tradition has held the position that his argument is independent of any metaphysical premises and that it can be interpreted and applied widely. Thus, later developments in the analytic philosophy of time relied on McTaggart’s paradox and the language it developed but ignored all other related arguments he proposed. In this thesis it is argued that McTaggart’s paradox can only be interpreted correctly if the metaphysical premises, outlined in “The Nature of Existence”, are added to the argument, yet responses and critiques, provided by later authors, completely ignore them. This proposition relies on R. Ingthorsson’s analysis of McTaggart’s paradox and its relation the metaphysical system outlined in “The Nature of Existence”. The first part of the thesis is argued for by providing a detailed analysis of the two versions of McTaggart’s paradox and by showing that he bases his argument on concepts, premises and definitions outlined in earlier parts of “The Nature of Existence”. The second part of the thesis is argued for by showing that responses to the paradox rely on premises that are contradictory to the ones used by McTaggart. Finally, it is shown that nearly all developments that relied on the argument have interpreted it incorrectly. |