| Abstract [eng] |
Cartels are agreements or concerted practices between two or more competitors aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market or influencing the relevant parameters of competition through practices such as the fixing of purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions, the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of markets including bid – rigging, restrictions of imports or exports or anti-competitive actions against other competitors. Such practices are among the most serious violations of Article 81 EC. The amount of international cartels is constantly growing. The members of cartels create sophisticated schemes, hold meetings in hotels and use pre-paid phone – cards. All these facts makes the investigation of cartel complicated. Therefore, there is a trong need to have a special programme able to combat illegal agreements. The original version of the U.S. Corporate Leniency programme traces back to 1978. In 1996 Commission announced Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. Since the 8 th of December 2006 the new Notice replaced the 2002 Leniency Notice in which no undertaking has contacted the Commission in order to take advantage of the favourable treatment set out in the previous Notice. These master thesis analyses the key features that determine the effective enforcement of leniency programme: the importance of strict sanctions, criminal penalties for cartels, clarity and flexibility, harmonisation of programmes. The importance to balance private and public interest in the competition law context is also being discussed. The importance and problematic aspects of cooperation between US and EC is analysed in the second part of the research work. |
