Title The problem of relation between perception and imagination in Husserl’s philosophy /
Translation of Title Suvokimo ir vaizduotės santykio problema Husserlio filosofijoje.
Authors Molotokienė, Ernesta
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Pages 36
Keywords [eng] Perception ; imagination ; consciousness ; phenomenology
Abstract [eng] In the Western philosophy, the perception, in comparison with imagination, traditionally receives exceptional attention. Already antiquity thinkers attributed a privileged status to perception as the mind’s capability most closely approached to the cognition of reality with regard to other forms of the mind. Imagination episodically loomed just in the periphery of the history of philosophy, however, even in such circumstances imagination was understood not only as „imperfect“ perception, but also as radically different and unique capability of consciousness. However, until Edmund Husserl, no comprehensive research of the imagination phenomena while revealing the fundamental ratio of perception and imagination had not been performed.The phenomenological description of the experiences of consciousness „legalizes“ imagination and from now its active prosecution starts: tracing imaginative traces it becomes clear that imagination has tangled all experiences of consciousness while staying in the shadow of consciousness, unreachable for reflection. Therefore it is logical that imaginary traces are seen most clearly where the shelter of imagination is expected in the least degree – in the field of perception. Researching the acts of perception and imagination phenomenologically, it becomes clear that the privileged position of perception and the claim to the authenticity of cognition is demolished by imagination, neutralizing the claims of all experiences to the authenticity, therefore perception becomes just one of the possibilities of authenticity practically not differing from the possible perception of imaginary reality. The ratio of perception and imagination is problematic: on the one hand, imagination is radically different form of consciousness, on the other hand, its functioning is enabled by perception. In this thesis we state that the differentiation of perception and imagination in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl is formal as, practically, perception and imagination are mutually dependent acts of consciousness: the ratio of the mutual dependence of perception and imagination is entrenched by imagination as in the modification concept of all-inclusive consciousness when imagination, freely varying the modified sensual contents, pierces the field of perception enabling its functioning.
Type Summaries of doctoral thesis
Language English
Publication date 2012