| Abstract [eng] |
This paper examines the factors that led to the reluctance of EU member states to adopt ambitious defense proposals after Russia started a war against Ukraine in 2022. Based on the theories of liberal intergovernmentalism and neorealism, the factors that could affect the reluctance of countries to integrate more deeply in the field of defense are distinguished. After identifying the factors, the work examines 3 EU member states in the context of the identified factors. Hypotheses considered in the work: Hypothesis H1: EU member states evaluate EC proposals according to their geopolitical preferences - the importance of national sovereignty and the perception of the Russian threat; Hypothesis H2: EU member states evaluate EC proposals according to economic preferences - defense production capacity and dependence on arms supply from the USA; Hypothesis H3: EU member states evaluate EC proposals according to national security preferences - strategic defense orientation; Main results: France sees its strategic defense orientation at the European level and believes that the collective use of resources and capabilities only strengthens the EU, so it openly and loudly advocates strategic autonomy. Independence from US-supplied weapons and a large defense industry within the country may also influence this. Sweden and Romania have an "Atlanticist" defense orientation and greater dependence on the United States. In general, in the opinion of the countries, NATO and not the EU is the guarantor of their security, so their approach in terms of strategic independence in the field of defense is more cautious. Both Sweden and Romania express concerns that the EU's defense cooperation should not be duplicated with the NATO alliance. Therefore, it can be seen that the greater presence of cooperation with the USA can encourage countries to react with restraint to EC proposals in the field of defense. |
