| Abstract [eng] |
The research paper Lithuania’s Security Strategy after 2022: Towards Total Defence? aims to reveal the reasons behind the slow implementation of the total defence model in Lithuania. Lithuania is going through a phase of security strategy change following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Lithuania can no longer rely on the support of its allies alone. Using Ukraine as an example, politicians raised the issue of the implementation of total defence, which has been unsuccessful in the past. The efforts made to establish a total defence system in Lithuania are unprecedented compared to the previous periods. However, despite the efforts over the last two years, the implementation remains largely a political declaration. It is therefore worth raising the question: what are the reasons for the slow implementation of the total defence model in Lithuania? To answer this question, the paper drew on theories of small state security strategies. The diversity of these theories allowed to discuss the choices a small state can make in terms of its defence approach. They were useful in revealing which factors were crucial in Lithuania’s strategic choice to opt for NATO as the preferred source of security, and how this choice has transformed within the alliance itself. This “alliance dynamics” showed that Lithuania was forced to respond to changing external threats and to reform its security strategy. Therefore, after 2022, Lithuania’s security strategy has evolved to a desire to combine collective defence with individual defence. The security strategies of small states help to understand why states take certain strategic decisions regarding the choice of defence strategy but they can’t explain why states can’t fully implement these strategies. In order to answer the question of the thesis, three hypotheses are tested. They stem from the public discourse and observations of the Lithuanian political space in recent years: 1) the barrier of the political election cycle; 2) low level of engagement of the Lithuanian civil society; 3) the absence of strategic planning and a lack of a hierarchy of defence priorities. The study used a semi-structured interview approach and interviewed decision-makers, institutional representatives, and former/current officers of the Lithuanian Armed Forces who have worked on the issue of total defence. Testing the electoral cycle hypothesis showed that there is no consensus at the political level on additional funding for defence. This leads to a lack of critical decisions that would allow funding for initiatives related to the implementation of total defence. The strategic planning hypothesis revealed that the fundamental problem is not in the planning procedures, but in the ability to ensure an effective implementation mechanism. Finally, although civil society participation in the implementation of total defence is not a key factor, it is changing marginally, as it is constrained by the two aforementioned factors – lack of resources and slow tactical implementation. All three factors lead to the result that the ambition of total defence is declared at the political level, but in practice its implementation is stalling. Two directions can be seen in which future research could develop. The results of the third hypothesis test showed that the main problem in the implementation of total defence lies in the executive branch. Here it would be useful to analyse their performance on the said issue in order to find specific factors that slow down the implementation process. Another factor to be explored in the future is the role of the commandants‘ offices. Although at the time of writing the thesis this institution is not yet fully operational, it is seen as an important factor in assessing the efforts of the current decision-makers in the implementation of the total defence model. These identified potential areas would allow for future research on the implementation of total defence in Lithuania. |
