| Abstract [eng] |
This research paper aimed to investigate Chinese economic coercion against Lithuania and to answer the main question: why China‘s economic coercive measures did not work against Lithuania. Three defensive thesis were set: 1) China‘s economic coercion, in the initial phase of its use, did not pose a high threat to Lithuania‘s strategic interests due to the limited volume of bilateral trade and direct investment; 2) China‘s secondary economic coercion (secondary sanctions), in the second phase of economic coercion, provoked the involvement and support of third parties, which strengthened Lithuania‘s stateness, and thus Vilnius decision-makers were able to withstand Beijing‘s economic pressure; 3) China‘s ability to maintain and continue its economic coercion against Lithuania has been significantly hampered by the international attention and assistance to Vilnius decision-makers. Based on the academic literature, the factors determining the effective use of economic instruments to achieve target‘s policy change were also relevant to the Lithuanian case. However, decision-makers in Vilnius, faced with Beijing‘s economic pressure, did not change their political position – economic coercion did not work. Therefore, the main aim of this research paper is to use the literature on economic sanctions and coercion to examine the episode of Chinese economic coercion against Lithuania and to identify the reasons why the instruments of economic coercion did not lead to the abandonment of the Taiwanese office in Vilnius. This study uses the theoretical model of economic statecraft. The main premise of this theory is that sanctions targeting strategically important or politically sensitive areas have a better chance of achieving their intended objectives because they pose a high threat to the strategic interests of the target state. This theoretical model operates on the following principle: the economic statecraft of the sender state against the target state are influenced by two intervening variables: threats to strategic interests (external) and statehood (internal). Lithuania had the moderate stateness to independently withstand Beijing‘s initial economic coercion. As China began the second phase of more intensive economic coercion the buffering effects of economic interdependence became evident. Representatives of Lithuanian companies and foreign capital companies pressure Vilnius decision-makers to resolve the crisis. As Chinese economic pressure mounted, the Simonyte‘s government turned to the EU for help, which initiated a WTO procedure to resolve the conflict. The financial support received from the EU helped to increase the level of stateness, specifically the economic capacity, of the Lithuanian government. However, this change was not the key factor in helping Vilnius to stop Chinese economic coercion – the EU‘s involvement and the start of procedure at the WTO played an important role. Thus, in summary, it can be argued that China‘s economic coercion against Lithuania did not work due to the following factors that undermine the effectiveness of economic instruments: low bilateral import and export volumes, the third parties (EU and other countries) involvement in the situation, and the high importance of the issue for Lithuanian policy makers. This research paper has contributed to the broadening of the field of research on economic coercion. The results of the research have shown the importance of third parties in the application of economic statecraft. It is also worth noting the buffering effect of economic interdependence in the context of economic coercion, thus further research could examine the impact of this factor on the effectiveness of economic statecraft. Finally, the research highlighted the growing bilateral trade and investment flows from China, thus further research could analyse China‘s growing economic influence in Lithuania and the potential threats in upcoming years. |
