| Abstract [eng] |
This master thesis analises the dynamics of interpretation of law and public values balanse. Interpretation of law is an important process, because it is the process, where natural law is identified from a legal text. Interpretation of law differs from formal logical actions, because the structure of law includes legal principles and legal norms. Legal principles express certain public values. It is hard to define relation between law and public values, because legal theory doesn’t have homologous conception of public values. Interpretation of law appeals to public values, but the perception of it is subjective at the first look, and it is rather hard to deny that statement. It determines confrontation between positive and natural law and that sets a task to define borders of law. But the law cannot be defined as a closed system, because the size of law is constantly changing. It is determined by various categories beyond the law. Law allows identifying itself by using categories that are formally beyond positive law. Law regulates conception of these categories in the area of law by elimination of subjectivity in its interpretation. Commonly critique is pointed to indetermination of legal interpretation process. Public values are a common category, which arise from the society and are evaluated, balanced, objectivised by law as ultima ratio implement regulation of social life. Obligation to do social justice induces judges to evaluate positive law. Backwardness in legislation in the sense of constantly changing social life precludes judge to state the unity of law form and content. Balancing of public values allows protecting underlying public values, which are identified from Constitution. Balancing of public values allows to retain legitimacy of law. In the works of legal positivists the emphasized risk to change regulation of legislator intention is not fairly reasoned. Author emphasizes in this master thesis that the analysis of recent legal practice verificates that law cannot be defined only as a legal text and that a wide-ranging judicial discretion does not determine high risk to emerge manipuliation of legal interpretation methods on subjective purposes, which sometimes coincide with objective purposes of state and society. |
