| Abstract [eng] |
This paper analyzes the process of the services market integration in the context of Services Directive and the national preferences of member states towards this document in particular and towards the process of services liberalization in general. The methodological guidelines for the research are provided by one of the contemporary theories of EU integration – liberal intergovernmentalism, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik in his prominent book The Choice for Europe. The main argument of this author is that “European integration can be best explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders.”(A. Moravcsik: 18) What follows as the main hypothetical proposition is that the integration of services market in the European Union rests upon national preferences of member states, which are shaped by domestic economic interests groups and upon relative bargaining powers of these member states. According to A. Moravcsik’s argumentation, it is assumed in this paper that it suffice to analyze three major member states – Germany, France and United Kingdom (UK). The analysis of this paper proved the relative interdependence between gains and bargaining power. It was showed, that UK has more competitive services providers, especially those providing professional services, then France and Germany. It is the reason why the service market opening could bring more benefits to British providers. This situation led UK to have less persuading arguments and made them make concessions. It was also proved that due to strong national concerns the Commission lacked ability to act as intermediate or shape national preferences towards its own position. In that case it was demonstrated, under A. Moravcsik terms, that the supranational body is irrelevant in EU policy making. It was partly vindicated that the governments pay more attention to the business interests. It was particularly true in UK, where the business interests were taken count of more then the interests of professional associations or consumer groups. But regarding the cases of France and Germany, the proposition of A. Moravcsik begs some reservations: when strong corporate culture thrives, well organized professional associations can counterweight the business interests, especially when the important referendums or elections are here to come. Lastly, it was impossible scientifically to test the validity of the statement, that UK strategically made concessions regarding the Services Directive, in order to gain more in other important issues, which were to be the beginning of Turkey accession talks, and the setting of financial perspective for the years 2007-2013. Such kind of evidence is possible only after some time, when the researcher can glance in to the archives. For the time being, the main hypothetical explanation could be the fact, that all those bargains were conducted during the period of British presidency in EU. The Services Directive case is a challenge for this paper in testing the explanatory capabilities of liberal intergovernmentalism. This theory is best in explaining “big” bargains, where only member states have a right to decide. The Services Directive is a piece of daily EU legislation, conducted under the co-decision procedure, where the European Parliament and the Council has an equal say. The paper showed that indeed some reservations should be made according to the institutional arena. Regarding the future of Services market integration, the research in this paper showed, that most probably the answer lies behind the member states. If their domestic interests groups see the process beneficial, and governments take that in to account, then there will be nothing that will stop Services Directive to be fulfilled to the greatest scale. Therefore the current, diluted version of this document should be considered as the second best solution for EU, and a marker for the future. |
