| Abstract [eng] |
In Levinas’s philosophy, responsibility and forgiveness appear as two related but not identical themes. The present article highlights two main issues concerning the relation between infinite responsibility for the Other and forgiveness. First, the question arises whether forgiveness is possible for a subject who, according to Levinas, is always at once both responsible and guilty. It is shown that infinite responsibility of the one for the Other and the subject’s “guiltless responsibility” do not imply that the subject must be forgiven. In other words, the subject, being in a moral condition of hostage, must accept responsibility without expecting forgiveness for unmet obligations. At the same time, however, it is revealed that an extreme subjective situation – being a hostage and being chosen – arises in proximity to the Other and opens the possibility of forgiveness (for withholding an otherwise selfish spontaneity). Second, the article shows that Levinas’s infinite responsibility of one for the other is not directly related to forgiveness of the Other. Although responsibility for the Other is asymmetrical, obligating the self, forgiveness does not belong to this structure of responsibility. On the contrary, forgiveness is conditional and depends on the efforts of the Other and his/ her relationships with others. Thus, in this interpretation, forgiveness is not an aspect of the ethical relationship between I and Other, which is based on infinite responsibility. Instead, it becomes a possibility of justice, related to the Third. In other words, forgiveness gains significance when the transgressions of the Other are evaluated in the presence of the others. |
