| Abstract [eng] |
The dissertation is a theoretical inquiry into Kantian conception of experience. It includes investigation of Kant’s epistemological apriorism, which is based on the difference between sensuous mater and conceptual form of cognition and the investigation of metaphysical part of Kantian theory of cognition. Certain metaphysical aspects are introduced by another significant distinction between “thing-in-itself” and “appearance”. The last difference is integral part of Kant’s theory of experience; it is closely combined with Kant’s epistemology. Polemics of the dissertation tends to show the significant aspects and philosophical implications of both main distinctions and especially the importance of idea of the thing-in-itself, which expresses certain understanding of the limits of metaphysical and empirical cognition in Kantian theory of experience. Present work not only criticizes various views on certain parts of Kant’s theory of experience, but at the same time uses the wide variety of other significant works of interpreters and investigators of Kant’s philosophy as well. The historical review of the reception of Kantian conception of experience enabled to present arguments contrasting Kant’s theory of experience with metaphysical realism and with the philosophy grounded on the postulate of unity of thinking and being and with naïve epistemological realism. Also research highlights metaphysical nominalism and epistemological realism apparent in Kant’s philosophical theory on experience. |
