| Abstract [eng] |
There is a substantial body of literature on lying, but hardly any of it deals explicitly with lying in politics from Wittgensteinian point of view, as only just a small amount of it analyze lying in the conceptual way and the rest part of it deals with the particular cases of lying in politics, which are well known in the contemporary history. However, since language is no longer conceived as being primarily about ‘naming’ objects, and then reasoning about them logically, but is rather visible as a socially developed, though individually used attribute of human society, which creates our world, and politics as well, we are concerned to analyze lie as a language game and to find its boundaries. By having this aim we adapt the techniques which in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein developed ‘to free us from captivity to mistaken ways of thinking’. For that reason after theoretical research of Wittgenstein philosophy we investigate the case of political language in the philosophical works of Michael J. Oakeshott, Murray Edelman, and Hanna F. Pitkin. Afterwards we take into account different theories of Augustine, Immanuel Kant, John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, and Thomas L. Carlson as different language games where we can find reflections on lying as such and highlight the qualities of this particular language game of lie. In the last part of this paper we deal with the question of lie in politics in the context of insights of Hannah Arendt, Alexandre Koyré, and John J. Mearsheimer. In the final conclusion we argue that lying is inseparable from the field of politics so that within the politics itself there always lies a possibility of a performative language game. This is not to deny, however, the importance of examining the moral dimensions of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, that task involves a different set of calculations and considerations, which lie beyond the scope of this paper. |
