| Abstract [eng] |
Pseudo-Plato’s “Definitions” (Ὃροι), a collection of 185 philosophical concepts and their definitions, is a text that has not received much attention and has only been rediscovered recently. While individual studies have attempted to trace the author or the period when the collection was compiled, the text itself has not yet been interpreted using a thematic approach to the definitions it contains. Furthermore, many translators and commentators have characterised “Definitions” as eclectic. This means that the work lacks a unified structure and does not reflect any particular philosophical doctrine, calling into question its philosophical value. This work aims to reveal the philosophical significance of “Definitions” by analysing the definitions of the main virtues and conceptualising the concept of virtue as formulated in the text. It argues that the concept of virtue in “Definitions” is characterised by clearly distinguished ethical, psychological, social, and political dimensions, and is based on Aristotle’s concept of virtue as ‘ἕξις’ in form and Plato’s content. However, the concept of virtue does not reflect the supremacy of φρόνησις; as a whole, it therefore postulates the Platonic principle of the soul as good order. To substantiate “Definitions”’ fundamental Platonism and prove the work’s philosophical significance, this thesis carries out a reconstruction of the concept of virtue. The first part of the work provides a historical and hermeneutic interpretation of the definitions of the cardinal virtues. The second part is based on the results of the first and provides a philosophical analysis to establish a unified concept of virtue. The work begins by presenting the historical and philosophical context of “Definitions”. A concise overview of the discussion developed in recent studies is provided, as well as a brief presentation of the tradition of formulating definitions from the early philosophers to Middle Platonism. The definitions are then analysed through the thematic prism of the cardinal virtues, deepening and expanding the analysis of possible sources and searching for a common structure and doctrine of definitions for all or most virtues. Finally, the revealed concept of the virtues is evaluated within the framework of the unity of the virtues principle, thus confirming the Platonic paradigm of the virtues and interpreting them in the context of Hellenistic philosophy. However, fragments of Hellenistic philosophy are incomplete and scarce, and many references to philosophical principles have survived only in the works of other authors, which distort the original source in any case. This makes difficult to interpret “Definitions” consistently as a work of Hellenistic philosophy. Nevertheless, the analysis carried out in this work isolates and thoroughly examines a specific part of the text, reconstructing its characteristic philosophical doctrine. This may serve as a starting point for further research on the topic. |
