| Abstract [eng] |
This Master's thesis examines accountability and responsibility in senior managers in Lithuania. The 18th Government of the Republic of Lithuania implemented a reform of public governance. The question was whether the reform of public governance had created effective measures to ensure the responsibility and accountability of senior managers. It was also unclear what loyalty and accountability relationships were developing between politicians and senior managers. The relationship between politicians and senior managers has been analysed using the theory of public service bargains and stewardship theory. It assesses whether the currently prevailing relationships between senior managers and politicians are consistent with the types of loyalty and bargains envisaged by the theory of public service bargains. The public service bargains model provides a fairly robust explanation of the trends in the Lithuanian public sector. The aim of this paper is to analyse whether the change/adoption of the senior managers’ corps model has changed the accountability of senior managers, and to explain how relations in the senior managers’ corps are changing. The objectives of the paper are: 1) to analyse whether the reform of public governance has affected the accountability and responsibility of senior managers; 2) to determine how the relationship between senior managers and politicians has changed after the reform of public governance; 3) to examine how accountability is most evident in the senior managers’ corps in Lithuania; 4) to assess what type of public service bargains are predominant in the Lithuanian senior managers’ corps. The paper puts forward three hypotheses. The first hypothesis, that the relationship between senior managers and politicians has changed because of the public governance reform, as the reform introduced or strengthened measures such as agreements on public goals and expectations or supervisory boards, which have strengthened the accountability and responsibility relationship, has been partially confirmed. Public governance reform has affected the relationship between senior managers and politicians. The public governance reform has led to greater trust in senior managers and more freedom in decision-making. With greater freedom and trust in senior managers has come greater accountability and responsibility. However, one of the significant instruments of the public governance reform, supervisory boards, are practically non-existent in budgetary institutions. Supervisory boards are supposed to reinforce the accountability of senior management, but the practical absence of this institution makes it impossible to assess changes. The second hypothesis, that the type of loyalty of senior managers has shifted from hierarchical to individualistic following the public governance reform, is confirmed in this case, as the political and legal environment, as well as the innovations introduced by the public governance reform (e.g. agreements on the state's objectives and expectations, supervisory boards), have led to the strengthening of the role of the 'doer' in the senior managers corps. The third hypothesis, that the public governance reform has strengthened the mechanism for assessing senior managers' performance, but that the actual accountability of senior managers has remained limited due to the established practice of non-sanctioning, has been confirmed. Performance evaluation has been strengthened with the public governance reform by introducing agreements on and monitoring of state objectives and expectations. The public governance reform has given greater flexibility in the remuneration of senior managers, but the actual level of pay depends on the position of the politician taking up the post. |
