| Abstract [eng] |
Nowadays people are more involved than ever and constantly “participate” in the world through media, yet at the same time they are increasingly distanced from the consequences of real actions, as experiences and decisions are continuously re-broadcast. This creates a growing gap between the individual and action, as well as between the individual and the space in which decisions are made. Such distance raises questions about responsibility in the digital age: does responsibility intensify and become not only an imperative of conscience, but also a demand imposed by the environment? How does an individual’s perception of responsibility change when it is dispersed beyond concentrated human action? The aim of this work is to examine whether, as media become intermediaries of perception, action, and experience, responsibility becomes fragmented and difficult to attribute to specific individuals. It also asks whether moral responsibility remains possible when reality becomes remote and action is partially simulated. This master’s thesis is based on Marshall McLuhan’s idea that media function as extensions of humans, empowering them through indirect action. Individuals can influence decision-making and public perception through small, mediated actions. This is possible because technology expands the scope of human activity by altering perceptions of time and space, enabling action without physical presence. Such an expanded sphere of influence would be inconceivable without modern media. Accepting this transformation of human action, the thesis examines how responsibility is affected. After an analysis of the theories of H. L. A. Hart, Karl Jaspers, Hannah Arendt, and Hans Jonas, defining points are identified to explain how responsibility should be understood today and what is required of individuals to act responsibly. First, individuals must be able to justify the motivations behind their actions, even under strong environmental and media stimulation. Media have become an integral part of everyday life, and failure to recognise their influence on decision-making threatens autonomy. Understanding motivation is therefore the foundation of sustainable responsibility. Also, true responsibility requires a distinction between action and inaction. Drawing on Jaspers and Arendt, this work argues that individuals are responsible not only for what they do, but also for what they consciously choose not to do. In a highly stimulating environment, both action and inaction must result from reflective choice. The relationship between guilt and responsibility remains essential. While Arendt limits guilt to the moral level of the individual and Jaspers understands it as a spiritual relation to the world, this thesis combines both views. Individuals must assume personal guilt for their actions while also recognising guilt as a metaphysical dimension of collective human existence, supporting Jonas’s idea of humanity’s shared responsibility. Two forms of guilt are distinguished: individual guilt for past actions and anticipated guilt related to collective responsibility. Further, the expansion of human activity is accompanied by an expansion of power. As individuals gain greater influence over the world, their responsibility increases accordingly. This expansion is linked to free will, as responsibility arises only through consent to action, even when shaped by conformity. Finally, for individuals to remain morally active, they must engage in continuous self-reflection and dialogue with their conscience. In a world dominated by constant stimulation and instrumental action, reflection becomes a moral necessity. Guided by Hans Jonas’s ethics of responsibility, this thesis argues for a model of responsibility oriented not only toward present outcomes, but toward preserving moral agency for future generations. |
