| Abstract [eng] |
Dissertation contributes to the solution of the problem of the epistemic status of natural science. The questions of ontology and epistemology of science, questions about the semantics of scientific language and the methodology of science have been prominent in scientific realism-antirealism debate. One of the most important contemporary antirealist conceptions of science is constructive empiricism proposed by Bas van Fraassen. Constructive empiricism claims that science seeks merely empirically adequate and not necessarily true theories. This dissertation investigates if constructive empiricist conception of science is correct. Dissertation defines the philosophy of constructive empiricism from the polemical point of view: the key concepts of constructive empiricism are analyzed and the place of constructive empiricism among other contemporary philosophies of science is defined. Special attention is paid to the concept of empirical adequacy and the distinction between the observables and unobservables this concept presupposes. Dissertation also investigates to what extent constructive empiricism is compatible with actual scientific practice and hypothetical scientific practices. Dissertation concludes that constructive empiricism is defensible if it is based on skeptical attitude towards the possibility of defining, using methods of philosophy and in universal manner, the concepts that traditionally have been employed in epistemology to reflect on scientific knowledge. |
