| Abstract [eng] |
In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed „Rose revolution“. This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia‘s eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili‘s party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement „Georgian Dream“, led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili‘s electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters‘ trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter‘s efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow‘s economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia‘s agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country‘s economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition „Georgian Dream“. |
