| Abstract [eng] |
Over the past decade, the investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS) has faced a profound crisis of legitimacy, prompting the world’s leading institutions to develop reform plans. The subject of this master’s thesis is the transition from fragmented ad hoc arbitration to a permanent multilateral investment court. The broad reform landscape encompasses a range of ideas, from pragmatic, incremental approaches to radical institutional reforms of arbitration. The European Union has taken a leading role in this reform, having terminated its bilateral treaties in recent years and actively promoting the establishment of a multilateral investment court. Reform is a necessary measure for the EU to fill the legal vacuum created by the Achmea (C-284/16) and other ECJ rulings, thereby safeguarding its legal autonomy and public order. The master’s thesis highlights the doubts expressed in extensive academic doctrine regarding the feasibility of a permanent court due to the deep fragmentation of opinions. A recent example from the WTO Appellate Body illustrates the lessons of strong jurisprudence but weak governance, which led to the institution’s paralysis. The pragmatic United States proposes a quasi-judicial appeals process based on limited improvements in procedural transparency and the impartiality of arbitrators. China is actively shaping regional models for investment and dispute resolution and seeks a compromise beneficial to developing industries. The author argues that a standing appeals mechanism operating without a full-fledged multilateral investment court structure is a more flexible and politically acceptable alternative. Such an ICSID mechanism, as proposed by the UNCITRAL Working Group III, would ensure a balance between investors’ rights and the state’s sovereign power to regulate the public interest. The results of the author’s analysis show that the success of the project will depend on the integration of the case referral mechanism and ensuring its compatibility with the ICSID and New York Conventions. The prospects for investment arbitration reform will depend not only on the logic of legal concepts but also on the ability of geopolitical forces to find a compromise in a multipolar world. |
