| Abstract [eng] |
The dissertation aims to provide a systematic investigation of the development of the notion of attention in the Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Current discussion on how Husserl conceived attention points to a necessity of such investigations and implies that a sufficiently sound approach on how the phenomenon of attention should be exposed to a phenomenological analysis had not yet been established. The polemic extends through several important themes (the conception of the relation between attention and abstraction, the role of attention in the phenomenological reduction, the relation between reflection-model and attention), but the most heated debate permeates the question of the relation and / or distinction of the phenomena of attention and intentionality. In the critical literature a general consensus is that Husserl distinguished these phenomena in Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis and further on, yet the question of early Husserl's notion of attention is still a contentious one. Roughly two sides of the argument could be exposed: first one, denying an early distinct notion of attention in respect to the phenomenological thematic of intentionality; second one, claiming that early Husserl distinguished attention from intentionality and conceived them as (more or less) separate fields of phenomenological inquiry. The dissertation provides a study of Logical investigations through the lens of the attention problematic, showing that the notion of attention must be formulated separately, otherwise it becomes impossible to describe the difference between individualizing and generalizing intentions. The investigation of Husserl's Perception and Attention and Analyses reveals the latter side to be more in accord with Husserl's work and allows the development of a description, fitting the evolution of the Husserl's notion of attention, that the universal content of attention, defined by the concept of theoretical interest, is a multi layered unity of syntheses of anticipation and fulfilment. |
