| Abstract [eng] |
Limiting coercion is the foundation of political morality in liberal democracies. Criminal justice, on the one hand, responds to coercion; on the other hand, it institutionalizes it. Mixed, neoclassical theories have come to the forefront of contemporary criminal law philosophy by demonstrating that the classical conception of the person justifies stricter limits on criminal law than the rehabilitative ideal. However, the traditional concept of the person is changing, and neuroscience threatens to ultimately dissolve the person as a unified moral agent and subject of responsibility. At the same time, neurointerventions—that is, methods for influencing and altering a person’s personal characteristics—are advancing. As the potential for coercion grows and changes, doubts are mounting as to whether neoclassical theories are still plausible and capable of justifying strict limits on punishment. In this dissertation, the fundamental principles of these theories and their main alternatives—such as theories grounded in various utilitarian objectives, abolitionism, and restorative justice—are evaluated specifically in terms of their ability to justify limits on the coercive power of criminal law, given the advancement of neurointerventions and the changing concept of the person. It is argued that a mixed, neoclassical theory of criminal law, based on the concepts of autonomy and control, is superior to the aforementioned alternatives in this regard. The foundations of such a theory are formulated in the dissertation. In substantiating this theory, it is also argued for several new, or rarely, including the claim that control—rather than rational choice or action—is a necessary condition for criminal liability; that the poor self-control that led to commiting a crime is what one is punished for; and that a violation of autonomy, rather than the infliction of suffering, is the fundamental and necessary feature of punishment. Furthermore, a position compatible with the foundations of neoclassical liberalism in criminal law is formulated and justified regarding the application of neurointerventions in criminal law. |
