| Abstract [eng] |
This dissertation examines the problem of self-knowledge. It takes the viewpoint of the interpretive-sensory access theory (Carruthers 2011). The theory claims that one comes to know one’s own and other people’s propositional attitudes (e.g., decisions) using one and the same mental faculty that has sensory access to its own domain, that has interpretive, but not transparent, access to most of one’s own attitudes, and that evolved for acquiring knowledge about other people’s mental states. The main claim defended in the dissertation is that the theory receives support from empirical research on intuition, meditation, and free will. The main claim is supported by three main arguments. First, empirical research on intuition supports the theory since they both suggest that self-knowledge is acquired either unconsciously, or by conscious interpretation. Second, empirical research on meditation supports the theory since they both suggest that even meditators misattribute attitudes to themselves and find their thoughts difficult to control. Third, empirical research on free will supports the theory since they both suggest that people attribute attitudes to themselves based on both external evidence (perceived behaviour) and internal evidence (mental imagery). Arguments for and against the theory presented by other authors are also examined. The broad conclusion that this dissertation makes is that the theory is superior to its main rivals. |
