Title On the Nash equilibrium in the inspector problem /
Another Title Nešo pusiausvyra inspektoriaus uždavinyje.
Authors Sabaliauskas, Martynas ; Mockus, Jonas
DOI 10.15388/LMR.A.2014.15
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Is Part of Lietuvos matematikos rinkinys. Ser. A.. Vilnius : Vilniaus universiteto leidykla. 2014, t. 55, p. 79-84.. ISSN 0132-2818. eISSN 2335-898X
Keywords [eng] game theory ; Nash equilibrium ; polynomial complexity
Abstract [eng] Inspector problem represents an economic duel of inspector and law violator and is formulated as a bimatrix game. In general, bimatrix game is NP-complete problem. The inspector problem is a special case where the equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In this paper, a generalized version of the Inspector Problem is described with the aim to represent broader family of applied problems, including the optimization of security systems. The explicit solution is provided and the Modified Strategy Elimination algorithm is introduced.
Published Vilnius : Vilniaus universiteto leidykla
Type Journal article
Language English
Publication date 2014
CC license CC license description