| Abstract [eng] |
The aim of this work was to show how the absence of a concept of person in R. Dworkin’s philosophy affects his understanding of politics. As a point of reference, R. Spaemann's philosophy was used, as both authors were interested in similar philosophical topics and have a comparable vocabulary, but one of their most striking differences lies in their relationship to the concept of person - in his philosophy Spaemann relies on a developed teleological concept of person, while Dworkin is critical of the concept of person. The work shows that Dworkin 's philosophy is ambiguous in its origins, as it is impossible to answer clearly whether it is based on natural law or analytical tradition. Dworkin does not decide whether he is a normativist, as a result of which his philosophy presupposes that a number of concepts important to our political discourse have a normative ontological beginning, but he never say so directly. This has implications for the integrity of Dworkin’s philosophy, as it ultimately results in those concepts still remaining instrumental rather than ontological for Dworkin, which weakens his positions because he usually sets normative goals for his philosophy. |
