| Abstract [eng] |
Concept of Virtue in Contemporary Democratic Theory: an Alternative to A. MacIntyre. This paper examines the relationship between the theories of virtue ethics and the theories of contemporary democracy, as an alternative to the theories of Alasdair MacIntyre. The aim is to provide an alternative assessment of the relationship between these concepts than that provided by MacIntyre, incorporating two important concepts that have not been explored in detail by the philosopher: democracy and sovereign. Assessments of the virtue ethic in contemporary theories of democracy have not been explored in detail, often simply emphasizing the theoretical incompatibility of these concepts. This leads to both various theoretical tensions and the resulting ethical issues in practical politics. The aim is to show that a thorough analysis of the theories of modern democracy and the sovereign concept can help to better understand the theoretical tensions between the virtue ethics and modern democracy. An analysis of Macintyre’s theories of virtue ethics and politics reveals that the philosopher does not pay enough attention to the theoretical understanding of modern democracy and therefore does not fully appreciate its relationship to virtue ethics. The analysis of the concept of contemporary democracy in this paper indicates that MacIntyre also refers to similar problems, which suggests that an analysis of the concept of democracy is needed to understand the author's philosophy. The paper introduces the sovereign concept necessary to understand the theoretical basis of contemporary democracy in order to find an alternative way to re-evaluate the theoretical tension of modern democracy and virtue ethics. Analysis of the concept of sovereign shows that Rousseau’s concept of sovereign as the general will can provide an alternative understanding of the moral and ethical basis of contemporary democracy. The idea of general will also allows to re-evaluate the key problems of virtue ethics in contemporary theories, raised by MacIntyre, such as the pursuit of the common good and the problem of a legitimate political authority.66 Despite the fact that modern theories of democracy and classical theories of virtue ethics seem incompatible at first sight, a detailed analysis of these theories, including the sovereign concept necessary for the modern concept of democracy, showed that virtue ethics and modern democracy can be explanatory or complementary aspects. In order to thoroughly evaluate virtue ethics, it is important to understand the theoretical political background in which virtue ethics are analyzed, as they are closely related to political sphere. Moreover, the concept of sovereign in the theories of contemporary democracy has a similar role and effect as the concept of virtue ethics in the classic theories. Classic virtue ethics (as described by Aristotle) are not possible (or even morally acceptable) in the fields of contemporary democratic theories; however, this study shows that generally, virtue ethics should not be dismissed from contemporary democratic theories. These findings suggest that it is necessary to treat democracy as a political regime in order to analyze its compatibility with virtue ethics. |
