| Abstract [eng] |
Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been looking for a way to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, yet none of the Russian approaches have worked as expected. In 2014, what began as a covert and bloodless Russian operation to annex the Crimean peninsula, has later turned into a quagmire in eastern Ukraine with losses on both sides totaling more than 44 thousand killed and wounded in February 2020. Why hasn’t Moscow been able to successfully impose its demands on Kyiv to stand down and grant the so called ‘special status’ for the Russian-occupied territories? Despite substantial analysis carried out concerning the causes of Moscow’s intervention and the ways and means Russia uses to wage warfare, research into the effectiveness of Russian strategy has received only limited scholarly attention so far. This thesis, titled “Causes of ineffectiveness of Russia’s strategy in the conflict with Ukraine from 2014 to 2019,” attempts to address this problem by seeking to explain the main reasons behind the failure of Russian compellence in eastern Ukraine. A theoretical framework of coercion is employed to help guide the analysis and scrutinize the strategic interaction between Moscow and Kyiv. Two main explanations of why Moscow has failed to achieve its strategic objectives in Ukraine are offered. First, it is argued that Russia has been unable to inflict the level of damage necessary to coerce Ukraine into choosing the option of ceding to Russia’s demands and willingly limiting its sovereignty. Second, it is maintained that Moscow is unable to provide adequate assurances that it would respect any agreement not favorable to it and refrain from any future demands, therefore leaving Kyiv with no other choice but to stand its ground. Compellence is a complex strategy which is difficult to execute successfully for any actor, not just Moscow. A recommendation is put forward to focus on possible explanations of why Russia has not been able to find the right balance between compliance and resistance costs levied against Ukraine. It is necessary to determine what are the practical limits of Russian hard power. Even though Russia is a nuclear power, it cannot credibly threaten to employ its whole strategic arsenal against Kyiv, and so can in principle only count on limited means of coercion. Russia also must refrain from inflicting catastrophic damage upon Ukraine, as Moscow still hopes to coerce or coopt Kyiv into closer integration with Russia. Therefore, was Kyiv able to call Moscow’s bluff or did Russia fail to find the correct pressure points to help break Kyiv’s resistance? |
