| Abstract [eng] |
Historiographical Analysis of the Origins of the First World War: Neoclassical Realism Explanation Even though the historiographical debate on the origins of the First World War is renewed, this perspective is not articulated through the theories of international relations, therefore, traditional realism theories still dominates the domain on the explanation of the causes of the First World. In this thesis, the origins of the First World War are examined by the new historiography and the theory of neoclassical realism. While examining the old and new historiography on the origins of the First World war, it is observed that there are huge differences between these two historiographical perspectives. While analysing, how the classical, structural and offensive realism explains the causes of the First World War, it is noticed that these interpretations highlight the phenomena that are discerned in the old historiography on the sources of war. In this research, the new historiography is examined through the variables distinguished by the theory of neoclassical realism — systemic variable and intervening variable. European system in the years of 1905-1914 is examined at the systemic level. The actions of decision-makers in the 1914 July crisis are studied in the level of the intervening variable. In the systemic level, it is stated that European system before the summer of 1914 was restrictive and it was a system of unclear signals; moreover, the system was complicated, it had signs that prone either to war and to peace. Despite the existence of alliances, systemic changes hadn't anticipated the opportunities, intentions and decisions for the states. Though this kind of condition before 1914 itself did not lead European states into the war. European countries experienced multiple crises, in which the resolutions were reached, and these crises had elucidated the dynamic that overstepped the alliances. In the level of intervening variable, it is asserted that during the July crisis the decision-makers were restricted by the existence of alliances, the leaders have operated while being escorted by the incorrect assumptions; their actions were carefree, the principles of subordination were violated, the decisions of leaders were followed by the bad luck and unfavourable eventualities. Thus it is argued that neoclassical realism allows synchronizing the two most important variables — systemic level and the decision-maker; additionally, it gives a chance to see the connection between these two variables; while the traditional realism theories rightly identify the conditions of systemic level, though these theories don’t possess instruments to analyse the role of decision-makers. The conclusion is made that the war originated as a result from 1) the system, which was restrictive and was characterised by the mixed signals, which complicated the efforts of the leaders to manage the July crisis; and 2) various mistakes that were done by the decision-makers, the improvidence of the leaders, the fact that they were accompanied by mistaken assumptions, numerous unlucky coincidences and bad fortune. |
